HKX High-Speed Rail Project: Hamburg-Cologne, Germany

Hamburg-Köln Express (HKX) high-speed rail project failed due to track access denial and regulatory hurdles, highlighting challenges for new entrants in the German railway sector.

HKX High-Speed Rail Project: Hamburg-Cologne, Germany
December 10, 2009 11:28 am




Hamburg-Köln Express (HKX) – Railway Technology

Hamburg-Köln Express (HKX) – Railway Technology

This article explores the technical aspects and challenges faced by the Hamburg-Köln Express (HKX) project, a planned high-speed rail service between Hamburg and Cologne in Germany. The project aimed to introduce competition to the German railway market, dominated by Deutsche Bahn (DB), and provide a high-quality, cost-effective intercity rail connection. We will delve into the specifics of the rolling stock, the planned infrastructure utilization, the legal battles faced due to access to the railway network, and the wider context of European Union (EU) railway deregulation efforts. The analysis aims to understand the technical and regulatory hurdles involved in establishing a new high-speed rail service in a mature and established market, offering insights into the challenges and opportunities in the railway sector. The project’s ultimate failure, despite its ambitious goals and significant investment, highlights the complexities of challenging incumbents in highly regulated industries. This examination will provide valuable lessons for future rail projects looking to enter established markets.

Rolling Stock and Technical Specifications

The HKX project planned to utilize Class 4010 Electric Multiple Units (EMUs), previously operated by the Austrian Federal Railways (ÖBB) and acquired by the Railroad Development Corporation. These EMUs underwent modernization at DB Delitzsch, a railway repair facility. Key technical specifications of the Class 4010 EMUs are summarized below:

SpecificationValue
TypeElectric Multiple Unit (EMU)
Power System15kV / 16.7Hz
Top Speed150 km/h
Continuous Power2,265 kW
Hourly Output2,500 kW
Service Weight283 t
Carriage Length26.4 m
Number of Carriages per Set6
Drive SystemBBC spring drive

The train configuration included a power car, a large second-class coach, a second-class compartment coach, two additional second-class compartments with a dining car, and first-class compartment coaches, along with a driving trailer. The second-class seating offered a 2+1 layout with generous luggage space. Locomore, the operator, planned to invest €100 million in the rolling stock.

Infrastructure and Network Access

The HKX route was planned to traverse a significant distance, approximately 357 km, connecting Hamburg and Cologne. Intermediate stops included Harburg, Sagehorn (Bremen), Osnabrück, Münster, Gelsenkirchen, Essen, Duisburg, and Düsseldorf. New infrastructure, including upgraded infirmary facilities, was planned for Duisburg, Essen, and Gelsenkirchen stations. A critical challenge arose with access to the existing rail infrastructure, owned and operated by DB Netze, a Deutsche Bahn subsidiary. DB rejected Locomore’s request to utilize its tracks, leading to legal action.

Competition and Regulatory Landscape

The HKX project was intended to foster competition within the German rail market, which was largely dominated by DB. The entry of other players, like Locomore and SNCF (the French national railway company), highlighted the need for regulatory reform within the European railway sector. SNCF also encountered difficulties gaining access to the German rail network and appealed to the European Commission. The EU’s plans to deregulate the European railway sector by 2014 aimed to increase competition, enhance interoperability and safety, and develop rail infrastructure. The resistance encountered by HKX and SNCF underscored the obstacles to market entry even in the face of EU initiatives.

Project Outcomes and Lessons Learned

Despite ambitious goals and significant investment, the Hamburg-Köln Express project ultimately failed to launch as planned. While initial plans targeted commencement in December 2011, creating 60 jobs, this timeline was not met, and the service never began operation. The key reasons for failure were the inability to secure track access from DB Netze, leading to protracted legal battles that delayed the project indefinitely, and the inherent difficulties in challenging the dominance of an established national railway operator. The HKX experience underscores the complex interplay between technical feasibility, regulatory hurdles, and market dynamics in the railway industry. Future rail projects, especially those seeking to compete with established operators in mature markets, need to carefully assess and mitigate the risks associated with securing necessary infrastructure access, navigate the complexities of regulatory frameworks, and manage stakeholder expectations effectively. The EU’s efforts towards railway deregulation, while well-intentioned, did not immediately translate into a level playing field for new entrants. Further regulatory reforms and a commitment to open access to critical infrastructure are crucial to fostering true competition and innovation in the European rail sector.

Company Information:

  • Deutsche Bahn (DB): Germany’s national railway company, operating passenger and freight services and owning the national rail infrastructure through DB Netze.
  • Locomore: A private German railway company that attempted to launch the HKX service. The company is now defunct.
  • SNCF: The French national railway company that also sought to enter the German market.
  • ÖBB (Austrian Federal Railways): The Austrian national railway company, former operator of the Class 4010 EMUs used by HKX.
  • Sqills: A provider of rail booking and revenue management services, contracted by HKX.